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The Confl ict between Liberty and Security 




 Questo articolo analizza alcune delle risposte legislative che sono state 
formulate nel Regno Unito sulla scia degli attacchi terroristici dell’11 set-
tembre 2001, nonché la giurisprudenza emersa in merito a tali misure 
straordinarie. Le leggi e i casi proposti evidenziano il confl itto con la liber-
tà determinatosi a seguito dell’adozione di queste misure. È stato analiz-
zato l’Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act del 2001. Si esaminano due 
casi concreti: il primo caso riguarda la detenzione a tempo indetermina-
to senza processo presso il carcere di Belmarsh; il secondo caso riguarda 
l’ammissibilità di prove ottenute attraverso la tortura. Sono anche breve-
mente analizzati i “Control Orders”. Sono inoltre analizzate la sentenza 
della Corte d’Appello Binyam Mohamed, che riguarda la divulgazione di 
informazioni sensibili relative alla sicurezza e la proposta del Governo 
nel suo Libro verde “Justice and Security” di rendere possibile in tutti i 
procedimenti civili tenere udienze a porte chiuse quando siano affrontate 
questioni relative alla sicurezza.
1. Introduction
Ten year after the events of 9.11 in the USA is an appropriate time to 
refl ect on the impact to liberty of governmental reactions to those 
events. A constant refrain of government and the courts when ad-
dressing these issues and commentators more generally is the need 
to “strike the right balance between security and liberty”. “Striking the 
right balance” is in one sense a reasonable term in that it refl ects a 
serious and practical matter, namely, that government has to try and 
keep its people secure without turning the country into an authoritar-
ian state which has undermined the rule of law and individual liberty. 
Nonetheless, the term tells us nothing about how that balance should 
be struck, nor does it establish what priority or weight the competing 
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considerations or values ought to have. It is also evident that when 
supposedly ‘striking a balance’ the term ‘security’ is used as a means 
to add credibility to a particular set of proposals. For instance, the UK 
Government states in its recent Greenpaper, “The fi rst duty of govern-
ment is to safeguard our national security”1 and this assertion is used 
to indicate that all our liberties are dependent on this security, ergo, 
the security measures are justifi ed.
This article aims to identify some of the confl icts between liberty and 
security that have arisen as a result of the government’s security re-
lated measures in the last ten years and the response of the courts to 
those measures. This has to be assessed in the context of the UK con-
stitution and the structural strengths and weaknesses that the consti-
tution possesses. The absence of a written constitution gives ultimate 
legislative authority to Acts of Parliament. The Human Rights Act 1998 
introduced into domestic law for the fi rst time the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. Because of the dualist position the UK takes 
with regard to international treaties, the Convention only became 
binding on domestic courts in 2000 when the Human Rights Act took 
effect. The Human Rights Act does not give the courts the power to 
strike down primary legislation made by Parliament. Instead, the Act 
gives the courts the power to identify or declare whether the primary 
legislation is compatible or not with the Convention rights that the 
UK has ratifi ed. Although not directly rendering primary legislation 
invalid, declarations of incompatibility by the courts have led govern-
ments to change offending legislation, albeit in the security fi eld with 
legislation that also offends those rights but in a slightly different way. 
Other important structural features that should be borne in mind are 
that the Westminster style of government means that the executive 
controls the majority in the lower chamber (the House of Commons) 
as this is a precondition for forming a government, and that the ex-
ecutive has the legislative authority through the Parliament Acts 1911 
and 1949 to over-ride a legislative veto of the upper chamber (the 
House of Lords). The signifi cance of this is both simple and refl ected 
(1) Justice and Security, Cm 8194 (London: HMSO October 2011) at page XI.
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in the course of events. In a strict separation of powers, the legisla-
ture would act as a check on the executive. In the UK, contentious 
legislation of the sort this article will be considering, has been subject 
to vigorous criticism in both chambers of each House and also by 
the Select Committees that have scrutinised the legislative proposals. 
Ultimately, the government has been able to enforce its will and pass 
its legislation2. One consequence of the executive’s dominance in the 
legislature is to have shifted challenges to retrospective ones, namely 
challenges through the courts once the legislation has been enacted. 
Those challenges have to be brought by affected individuals and fall 
within specifi c human rights breaches of the European Convention. 
Such challenges are much narrower than debates that question the 
good sense or desirability of proposed measures, in other words, the 
sort of arguments that should prevail when the policy is being de-
bated in the context of legislative proposals.
2. The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
The UK Government’s legislative response to the events of 9.11 was 
to introduce in Parliament the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill. 
It should be noted that the UK had prior to 2001 an extensive set of 
legislative provisions relating to terrorism. This was due to the UK’s 
long history of attempting to combat Irish republican terrorism and 
the terrorism spawned in opposition to it. Indeed in 2000 an extensive 
Terrorism Act had been passed extending the defi nition of terrorism 
and the battery of powers that the government had at its disposal such 
as the power to detain under Schedule 8 of that Act and the power to 
arrest without warrant under Section 4(1). Similarly, the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 reviewed and considerably enhanced 
powers of surveillance of suspects, powers that could be used by both 
the police and the intelligence and security services3.
(2) Although in one celebrated if untypical episode on the 9th of November 2005 the 
government was defeated in the House of Commons in its attempt to extend detention 
without charge of terrorist suspects from 28 to 90 days.
(3) A review of this legislation can be found in C. WALKER, Blackstone’s Guide to the 
Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.
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The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (hereafter referred to 
as the Anti-terrorism Act 2001) is an omnibus act that covers diverse 
areas. Notwithstanding that it was highly contentious and vigorously 
opposed by many parliamentarians and all the major civil liberty and 
human rights organisations it was rushed through all its stages in 
Parliament in just three weeks. Alongside provisions for the detention 
of suspected international terrorists it is noteworthy that the govern-
ment took advantage of the perceived emergency to push through a 
whole range of measures that had met with resistance in the past. For 
instance, with regard to retention of communication data, the 2001 
Act enlarged the powers of government, notably the intelligence and 
security services and the police, to track the source, location and 
destination of all communications, mainly but not exclusively, elec-
tronic and telephonic communications4. Part XIII of the Act allowed 
the co-option by ministerial order of measures adopted under Title 
VI of the Treaty of European Union relating to police and judicial co-
operation in criminal matters. This legislative device, called a Henry 
VIII clause, effectively by-passes the requirement to put the changes 
of law into primary legislation made by Parliament. The government 
tried to suggest it was just regularising an existing procedure relating 
to Community law obligations under Section 2(2) of the European 
Communities Act 1972. This was certainly not the view taken by the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regula-
tory Reform which stated,
the fundamental issue ... is whether this procedure, which currently applies 
to economic and regulatory measures, should also apply to the most sensi-
tive areas of policing and criminal justice, with the potential to impinge on 
individual rights and liberties. Such measures were undoubtedly not contem-
plated when the 1972 Act procedure was approved by Parliament5.
A third strand in the Anti-terrorism Act 2001, powers to disclose in-
formation held by public authorities, again demonstrates how a per-
(4) See Part XI, sections 102-107 of the Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
(5) House of Lords Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform, 7th 
Report, HL (Session 2001-2002) at paragraph 7.
03_payne.indd   776 20/02/12   16:47
777SAGGI E ARTICOLI
ceived crisis can be exploited to extend state powers at the expense 
of civil liberties. Part III of the Act gives public authorities the powers 
to disclose information for the purpose of “any criminal investigation 
whatever”6, “any criminal proceedings whatever”7 and the “initiation 
or bringing to an end of any such investigation or proceedings”8. It 
is plainly obvious that these powers are not limited to terrorism. The 
Government had already tried to introduce similar measures in the 
Criminal Justice and Police Bill 2001 and had retreated on this9. The 
Anti-terrorism Act 2001 gives the Government and public authorities 
very wide powers to disclose information on individuals and organi-
sations. Schedule 4 of the Act lists a vast array of existing statutory 
powers to collect information that these new powers permit disclo-
sure of. The surveillance and intrusion of privacy that these combined 
powers create is very sinister given that the information is collected 
on the whole population in the course of everyday life and citizens 
interactions with the state. These provisions were strongly criticised 
by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The Government by way of 
concession introduced a subsection into the Bill stating that a public 
authority could only make a disclosure of information if it was satis-
fi ed that that the disclosure was “proportionate to what is sought to be 
achieved”10. The Joint Committee was not impressed by the conces-
sion stating that it did not meet their fundamental concerns in relation 
to the “sharing of information between agencies for the purposes of 
an unlimited range of criminal investigations including potential in-
vestigations by foreign agencies”11. The Joint Committee also thought 
that the disclosure powers would violate the right to respect for a 
(6) Section 17 (2) (a) Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
(7) Section 17 (2) (b).
(8) Section 17 (2) (c).
(9) Joint Committee on Human Rights. 2nd Report, Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Bill. HL 337 HC 372 (Session 2001-2002) at paragraph 53.
(10) Section 17 (5) Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
(11) Joint Committee on Human Rights. 5th Report, Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Bill: Further Report. HL 51 HC 420 (Session 2001-2002) at paragraph 24.
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private life under Article 8 of the European Convention as a conse-
quence of the “range of offences covered, and the lack of statutory 
criteria to guide decisions and the lack of procedural guidelines to be 
followed”12.
3. Part IV of the Anti-terrorism Act 2001: Immigration and Asylum
Part IV of the Act attracted the most publicity and criticism during 
the passage of the Bill through Parliament. It was entirely predictable 
that it would be subject to challenge in the courts. This part of the 
Act was disingenuously called ‘Immigration and Asylum’ whereas its 
true purpose was detention, deportation and the curtailing of asylum 
claims. For instance, the Home Secretary is empowered to exclude 
asylum claims where he certifi es that the individual’s removal is for 
the public good and the person in question is not covered by the 1951 
Refugee Convention13. The most alarming aspect of Part IV was the 
creation of indefi nite detention without trial of individuals certifi ed by 
the Home Secretary as international terrorists. The defi ning feature of 
those powers under Part IV was that they applied only to non-British 
nationals who were subject to immigration controls. The suspected 
international terrorists were not subjected to criminal charges in the 
classic sense of the term, namely charged with specifi ed criminal of-
fences which are tested in an open court in front of a judge and 
jury under the normal rules of evidence and burden and standard of 
proof: where the burden of proof is on the prosecution throughout 
the case and the standard of proof is whether the accused is guilty be-
yond all reasonable doubt. Under the new arrangements, the absence 
of a criminal trial was presumably motivated by the wish to detain 
those against whom there was no hard evidence of any specifi c crimi-
nal wrongdoing or because the intelligence and security services wish 
to conceal their sources and information or both. At the heart of the 
material to be used against individuals will be secret intelligence and 
security assessments of an individual’s alleged involvement with an 
(12) Ibid. at paragraph 24.
(13) Section 33 Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
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organisation. The assessment may be partial, speculative and subject 
to elements of hearsay that would be inadmissible in a criminal trial 
on the basis that they are prejudicial without being probative. Such 
overall assessments would, even if admissible in a criminal trial, most 
likely fail to attain the requisite standard of proof (even if individual 
pieces of evidence were probative) and indeed the assessment might 
fail to even identify a plot or specifi c set of actions pointing to a crime.
Sections 21-23 of the Act gave the Home Secretary the powers re-
ferred to above, to certify and detain an individual that he suspected 
of involvement with international terrorism14.
Under Section 21(2) a terrorist was defi ned as a person who is or has 
been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts 
of international terrorism or is a member of or belongs to an interna-
tional terrorist group or has links with an international terrorist group. 
A ‘link’ with a group only occurred if the named individual supported 
or assisted the group15. Terrorism as a term was given16 the expansive 
meaning created by Section 1(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000, that is: use 
or threat of action designed to infl uence the government or intimidate 
the public or a section of the public made for the purpose of advanc-
ing a political, religious or ideological cause.
Another defi ning feature of the group potentially subject to this in-
defi nite detention procedure was that the Home Secretary would or-
dinarily have deported the individuals but could not, either because 
there was no country that would accept them or that the country that 
it would have been possible to deport them to might torture them. 
A legal challenge to the certifi cation was subject to stringent limit-
ing factors and procedures. A challenge to certifi cation could only 
be made to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC)17, a 
special tribunal which deals with sensitive security related matters 
(14) The certifi cate may be issued if the Home Secretary reasonably believes that the 
person’s presence in the UK is a risk to national security and suspects that the person 
is a terrorist. See Section 21 (a) and (b) Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
(15) Section 21 (4) Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
(16) Section 21 (5) Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
(17) Section 25 Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
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that touch on those subject to immigration controls and are therefore 
potentially liable to deportation. SIAC had to cancel the certifi cate if 
it considered that there were no reasonable grounds for a belief or 
suspicion in involvement or links with international terrorist activity18 
or it considered that for some other reasons the certifi cate should not 
have been issued19. There was to be a SIAC review of each certifi cate 
after the fi rst six months of certifi cation20 and then at three monthly 
intervals21. The Act excluded judicial review or a writ of habeas cor-
pus22. Section 21(8) of the Act specifi ed that a legal challenge was 
limited to the provisions of Section 25 or 26; these required that chal-
lenges were only made to SIAC; thereafter there could be an appeal 
to the Court of Appeal but limited to a challenge on a point of law23.
SIAC was established by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
Act 1997. It is clearly an improvement on its forerunner, an Advisory 
Panel which the European Court of Human Rights had determined 
was not a court within the meaning of Article 5(4) of the Conven-
tion24. SIAC has been described as, “the latest attempt to solve the per-
ennial problem of squaring procedural safeguards for the individual 
with the national security interests of the State”25. The extension of 
SIAC’s remit to deal with the Anti-terrorism Act 2001 detention cases 
led to SIAC being subjected to scrutiny as to its function and criticism 
as to the fairness of its procedures in particular the role of the special 
advocates and the lack of information supplied to detainees with re-
gard to the substance of the secret case against them26.
(18) Section 25 (2) (a) Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
(19) Section 25 (2) (b) Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
(20) Section 26 (1) Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
(21) Section 26 (3) Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
(22) An ancient right of challenge in the courts against unlawful detention.
(23) Section 27 (1) (b) Anti-terrorism Act 2001.
(24) Chahal v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413 at paragraph 130.
(25) C. WALKER, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002 at page 223.
(26) See the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Select Committee, 7th Report, 
The operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) and the use of Spe-
cial Advocates. HC 323-1 (Session 2004-2005).
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It is hardly surprising that the whole apparatus of indefi nite detention, 
being a radical departure from the normal standards of justice, would 
be in breach of Article 5 of the European Convention, namely that 
everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. Nor would 
any of the permitted grounds under Article 5 of depriving an indi-
vidual of his liberty apply to a scheme of indefi nite detention without 
trial. Bearing in mind that to deport a person to a country where they 
might be tortured is a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention 
and that that article is non-derogable, the UK Government had three 
options: abandon the proposed scheme; withdraw from the Conven-
tion and attempt to re-enter with a Reservation against Article 3 or 
derogate from Article 5. The Government chose to derogate from Arti-
cle 5 which is permitted under Article 15 which states that, “In time of 
war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation”, the 
country in question may take measures derogating from an obligation 
but only “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situ-
ation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other 
obligations under international law”.
Because the obligations under the Convention had been enshrined in 
domestic law, the Human Rights Act 1998, to derogate the UK Govern-
ment had to both comply with the Council of Europe requirements 
and produce a domestic measure to make the derogation effective in 
UK law. The Government produced an Order in Council to give effect 
to the derogation27. The Derogation Order specifi ed that the matter in 
issue was the “extended power to arrest and detain a foreign national” 
under the Anti-terrorism Act 200128.
There was immediate criticism of the Derogation Order. The organisa-
tion Liberty stated that there was “no imminent threat of the complete 
breakdown of the civil society in the UK”. Liberty also pointed that 
of the “forty or so countries signed up to the Convention we are the 
(27) The Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001, Statutory In-
strument 2001 (No 3644).
(28) Ibid.
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only country indicating that we want to opt out”29. Of course, were 
the conditions of derogation not met this would provide a ground 
for challenge on a point of law quite apart from any appeal to SIAC 
against individual certifi cation. Such an appeal could go from SIAC, to 
the Court of Appeal and on to the highest court, the House of Lords.
4. The Belmarsh Case: A and others v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department30
This case has been described by an eminent public lawyer as, “widely 
regarded as being one of the most constitutionally signifi cant ever 
decided by the House of Lords, as evidenced by the fact that it was 
heard by an unprecedented panel of nine judges rather than the usual 
fi ve”31.
The nine non-British nationals who were detained under Part IV of 
the Anti-terrorism Act 2001 appealed to SIAC challenging the law-
fulness of the scheme of detention (this challenge is to be distin-
guished from appeals against individual certifi cation). In issue was 
whether the derogation was justifi ed or not and whether the scheme 
of indefi nite detention was consistent with Convention rights. SIAC 
had concluded that there was a public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation which entitled the Government to derogate under 
Article 15 from its obligations to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation32. But SIAC quashed the 2001 Derogation 
Order and granted a declaration that Section 23 of the Anti-terrorism 
Act 2001 was incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the European 
Convention. The reason for this incompatibility was that the scheme 
was discriminatory because there were British nationals who posed 
a similar risk but who could not be detained in a similar fashion as 
the Act made no provision for this. The Court of Appeal reversed this 
(29) Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill: Briefi ng For The Second Reading In The 
House of Commons. Liberty, London, November 2001.
(30) A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (HL(E)) [2005] 2 AC 68.
(31) M. LOUGHLIN, A v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Introduction, Mo-
dern Law Review, Oxford, (2005) 68 (4) MLR 654-680 at 654.
(32) A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (HL(E)) [2005] 2 AC 68, at page 68.
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decision33. Before the House of Lords the appellants (i.e. the detain-
ees) argued, inter alia, that the characteristics of a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation, “are that (a) the state of affairs re-
lied on is temporary and exceptional (b) the circumstances are grave 
enough to threaten the organised life of the entire community (c) 
the emergency is actual or imminent in that the threatened danger 
is about to occur and (d) the threat is to the life of the nation that 
seeks to derogate”34. Since those characteristics were not present 
the threshold for derogation was not met under Article 1535. It was 
further argued that even if there were an emergency the scheme of 
executive indefi nite detention without trial of foreign nationals was 
not strictly required by the exigencies of the situation36. The test 
failed the proportionality test because there was not a rational link 
between the objective and the means employed37. It was argued on 
behalf of Liberty, that the scheme failed on grounds of proportional-
ity because it excluded those who constituted a risk (i.e. British na-
tionals)38 and, “In applying only to non-nationals the measures are 
under-inclusive, in that they do not meet the perceived threat; and 
they are over-inclusive in that they include those non-nationals who, 
although suspected of international terrorism and irremovable (See 
Chahal v United Kingdom 23 EHRR 413) do not represent a threat 
to the United Kingdom interests”39. Counsel for Liberty added that 
there had been no derogation from Article 14, the article on non-
discrimination. On an important constitutional point, it was submit-
ted that, “the only proper justifi cation for the courts declining to 
decide an issue is the relative institutional competence of the differ-
ent branches of the state” where the executive but not the court has 
(33) Ibid.
(34) Ibid., page 74 at H, Ben Emmerson QC.
(35) Ibid., page 75 at A.
(36) Ibid., page 75 at E.
(37) Ibid., page 75 at F.
(38) Ibid., page 81 at F, David Pannick QC.
(39) Ibid., page 82 at H.
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the benefi t of specifi c advice and expertise40. “That does not apply 
to SIAC, which is a specialist tribunal with expertise in the relevant 
fi eld or to the courts which have more expertise than the legislature 
or the executive on questions of due process, discrimination and 
proportionality”41. By contrast, the Attorney-General representing 
the Government argued that the Government was democratically 
accountable to Parliament and was responsible for the protection of 
the public and that assessing the risk to the public and formulating 
and implementing of protective measures was primarily for the Gov-
ernment and Parliament42. It was not for the court to substitute its 
view for that of the Government as to the effective measures to be 
taken43. On the discrimination point the Attorney-General submit-
ted that in the fi eld of immigration control it was legitimate for the 
state to distinguish between United Kingdom nationals and others44.
The leading judgment is provided by Lord Bingham. With regard to 
whether the derogation met the conditions of a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation, the court addressed a variety of 
factors before concluding that the conditions were met, and as indi-
cated in the head note, “the absence of a specifi c threat of an imme-
diate attack did not invalidate the assessment that there was a risk 
of a terrorist attack at some unspecifi ed time”45.
Lord Bingham stated that it had not been shown that SIAC and the 
Court of Appeal had misdirected themselves in accepting that there 
was a public emergency46. His second reason was that the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights on what constituted a public 
emergency would clearly encompass the factual scenario pertaining 
in the UK after the events of 9.1147. On the third issue, relating to 
(40) Ibid., page 82 at D.
(41) Ibid., page 82 at D.
(42) Ibid., page 85 at A. Lord Goldsmith QC.
(43) Ibid., page 86 at D.
(44) Ibid., page 86 at H.
(45) Ibid., page 69 at A.
(46) A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (HL(E)) [2005] 2 AC 68. Lord 
Bingham, paragraph 27.
(47) Ibid., paragraph 28.
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relative institutional competence (i.e. who should decide what), Lord 
Bingham stated that the more purely political a question is the more 
appropriate it is for political resolution rather than judicial. Similarly, 
the more the question was a legal one the greater the role of the 
court. Lord Bingham considered that the public emergency issue was 
very much a political question48. The other judges agreed on this 
point apart from Lord Hoffman who dissented. Lord Hoffman thought 
that the Attorney-General’s submissions and the judgments of SIAC 
treating “a threat of serious physical damage and loss of life as neces-
sarily involving a threat to the life of the nation” showed a misunder-
standing of what is meant by the term49. In a turn of phrase that has 
been much quoted he stated,
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in ac-
cordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terror-
ism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism 
may achieve. It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the terrorists such 
a victory50.
5. Proportionality
Lord Bingham accepted that the appellants were entitled to seek a re-
view of proportionality and he fi rmly rebutted the Attorney-General’s 
proposition that these were matters for the executive and not the 
courts. Lord Bingham stated that, “I do not in particular accept the 
distinction which he drew between democratic institutions and the 
courts... the function of independent judges charged to interpret and 
apply the law is universally recognised as a cardinal feature of the 
democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of law itself”51. He went 
on to quote Professor Jowell who had said, “The courts are charged 
by Parliament with delineating the boundaries of a rights-based de-
mocracy”52.
(48) Ibid., paragraph 29.
(49) Ibid., Lord Hoffman at paragraph 95.
(50) Ibid., Lord Hoffman at paragraph 97.
(51) Ibid., Lord Bingham at paragraph 42.
(52) Ibid., quoted at paragraph 42.
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On the substance of the proportionality issue Lord Bingham accepted 
the argument of the appellants and their central complaint that, “the 
choice of an immigration measure to address a security problem had 
the inevitable result of failing adequately to address that problem (by 
allowing non-UK suspected terrorists to leave the country with impu-
nity and leaving British suspected terrorists at large) while imposing 
the severe penalty of indefi nite detention on persons who, even if 
reasonably suspected of having links with Al-Qaeda, may harbour 
no hostile intention towards the United Kingdom”53. Lord Bingham 
concluded that the Derogation Order and the Section 23 were dispro-
portionate and that that such a conclusion was irresistible54.
6. Discrimination and Article 14
The United Kingdom did not derogate from Article 14 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and as Lord Bingham indicated, 
“The foreign nationality of the appellants does not preclude them 
from claiming the protection of their Convention rights”55. Lord Bing-
ham does not say that given the facts outlined with regard to lack 
of proportionality, discrimination clearly follows. Nonetheless, that is 
self evident and also implicit in his analysis. What Lord Bingham is 
at pains to point out is that the discrimination is not justifi ed because 
the fundamental comparator for this particular policy should be the 
total class of people who pose a risk rather than distinguishing peo-
ple on the grounds of their immigration status. In his judgment he 
states, “What has to be justifi ed is not the measure in issue but the 
difference in treatment between one person and another. What can-
not be justifi ed here is the decision to detain one group of suspected 
international terrorists, defi ned by nationality or immigration status, 
and not another. To do so was a violation of Article 14”56.
Lord Bingham and his fellow judges (Lord Walker dissenting) allowed 
(53) Ibid., Lord Bingham at paragraph 43.
(54) Ibid.
(55) Ibid., paragraph 48.
(56) Ibid., paragraph 68.
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the appeals and quashed the Derogation Order. The court also issued 
a declaration under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act that Section 23 
of the Anti-terrorism Act 2001 was incompatible with Article 5 and 14 
of the ECHR in so far as it was disproportionate and permitted deten-
tion of suspected international terrorists in a way that discriminated 
on the grounds of nationality or immigration status57.
7. Comments on the Case
Although one might have assumed that the decision of the House 
of Lords in this case would have been a cause for rejoicing amongst 
human rights lawyers the decision was subjected to criticism in some 
quarters. For instance, Tom Hickman described the approach of the 
court in accepting that there were valid grounds for designating a 
derogation on the basis of a public emergency as disappointing and 
that in particular “Lord Bingham’s approach essentially absolves the 
Government from advancing clear and convincing evidence to Par-
liament”58. Hickman argues that all the steps of Lord Bingham’s rea-
soning were questionable and that he should not have applied the 
“extremely deferential Strasbourg case law on Article 15”59. Hickman 
also criticises Lord Bingham for taking the view that the Government’s 
decision had to be shown to be wrong and unreasonable. Hickman 
suggests that the burden of proof should fall on the Government who 
“should be required to advance convincing evidence for derogating 
from its obligations to observe our human rights”60.
By contrast David Dyzenhaus attacked Lord Hoffman’s approach in 
holding that there was no emergency that justifi ed derogation61. Lord 
Hoffman’s apparent reliance on the common law and not providing a 
(57) Ibid., paragraph 73.
(58) T. HICKMAN, Between Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Indefi nite Detention and 
the Derogation Model of Constitutionalism Modern Law Review, Oxford, (2005) 68 (4) 
MLR 655-668 at page 662.
(59) Ibid., at page 663.
(60) Ibid.
(61) D. DYZENHAUS, An Unfortunate Outburst of Anglo-Saxon Parochialism, Modern 
Law Review, Oxford, (2005) 68 (4) MLR 673-676.
03_payne.indd   787 20/02/12   16:47
788 ISTITUZIONI DEL FEDERALISMO     4.2011
detailed analysis by way of the Human Rights Act and the European 
Convention was to be regarded as an “unfortunate outburst of Anglo-
Saxon parochialism”62. Stephen Tierney comments on the light touch 
approach adopted by the Strasbourg court with regard to derogation 
and that the leeway accorded to democracies is based on “the pre-
sumption that within these states the designation decision [to dero-
gate] will be subject to internal controls”63.
Whatever the supposed imperfections of the judgments of the House 
of Lords (traditionally referred to as opinions) I would suggest that 
the decision taken as a whole constitutes a resounding rebuke to the 
executive for putting in place a scheme that was so far removed from 
the norms of justice. It is true that the decisions focus on proportion-
ality and discrimination as the defects of the Government’s approach. 
Arguably, these were the most effective jurisprudential devices avail-
able to the court in rejecting the scheme. The courts are bound by 
prevailing norms to exercise a degree of restraint with regard to the 
will of Parliament and the Anti-terrorism Act 2001 was passed by 
Parliament embodying a belief that an emergency existed. Similarly, 
it is not easy for the courts to simply over-ride the executive’s assess-
ments of security threats. It is wiser for the courts to deploy the legal 
devices that the executive and parliament have approved by way of 
the Human Rights Act 1998. In this fashion the court reached the right 
decision without appearing to over-step their authority relative to the 
other branches of government.
The A case ruling led to the Government abandoning the detention 
scheme embodied in Part IV of the Act. Since a declaration of incom-
patibility does not automatically render the domestic law invalid, the 
Government’s willingness to comply with the court’s declaration at-
tests to the importance and weight of the judgments in this case. The 
fact that one would expect nothing less from the Government by way 
of respect and compliance should not lead one to overlook the exist-
ence of that respect.
(62) Ibid., at page 673.
(63) S. TIERNEY, Determining the State of Exception: What Role for Parliament and the 
Courts? Modern Law Review, Oxford, (2005) 68 (4) MLR 668-672 at page 669.
03_payne.indd   788 20/02/12   16:47
789SAGGI E ARTICOLI
8. Control Orders
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 repealed64 Sections 21-32 of the 
Anti-terrorism Act 2001. The later Act introduced control orders to 
replace the detention scheme. This article will not address the detail 
of the control order scheme other than to identify a few distinctive 
features. The control orders issued by the executive fall into two cate-
gories, derogating and non-derogating orders, the former being more 
restrictive. The Government has relied on non-derogating control or-
ders but even those effect substantial restrictions and have been sub-
ject to criticism in the courts for being excessively restrictive65. Section 
1(4) of the Act provides for extensive restrictions on the individual. 
Although the individual is not detained in prison the conditions can 
be highly restrictive. In Home Secretary v JJ 66 Lord Bingham stated that 
an analogy with an open prison was apt. In this case the individual in 
question was subjected to an eighteen hour curfew requiring him to 
stay at home, wear an electronic tag, seek permission for any visitors 
and outside of the curfew period he was not permitted to go far from 
his home. The courts have dealt with a stream of control order cases 
and whether they breach Article 5 of the Convention67.
More recently, the ruling in the AF (No 3)68 case has led to a reconsid-
eration of the viability of control orders from the point of view of the 
executive. The crucial point in that case was the absence of suffi cient 
information provided to the ‘controlee’ so that he could challenge the 
basis of the control order. In A v United Kingdom69 the European Court 
of Human Rights had ruled that whereas it was permissible to restrict 
the adversarial process on national security grounds, where disclosure 
was absent or lacking in substance there would be a breach of Article 
(64) Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 Section 16 (2) (a).
(65) C. WALKER, Blackstone Guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2009, 2nd Edition, page 29.
(66) [2007] UKHL 45.
(67) For a careful review of the issues relating to control orders see C. WALKER cited at 
note 65 above, chapter 7.
(68) Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and another [2009] UKHL 28.
(69) A v United Kingdom (App No 3455/05 19th February 2009).
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670. The Strasbourg ruling led the House of Lords in the AF (No 3) 
case to rule that, “the controlee must be given suffi cient information 
about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective in-
structions” to the special advocate in relation to those allegations71. In 
the Government’s recent Green Paper Justice and Security72 it states 
that as a result of the AF (No 3) case it faces a diffi cult choice, “as to 
how best to protect the public interest”73. The Green Paper goes on 
to say that it will repeal the control order legislation and replace it 
with a new system of terrorism prevention and investigation measures 
(TPIM). It also adds that the disclosure requirements established in the 
AF (No 3) case will be applied to the new measures when they are 
introduced74. It is clear that the decisions of the courts both in the 
UK and in Strasbourg have forced the Government to abandon two 
restrictive schemes that have breached the Convention75.
9. The A case No 2: and the Admissibility of Evidence Tainted by 
Torture76
The A case (No 2) is a continuation of the litigation in relation to the 
detainees held under Part IV of the Anti-terrorism Act 2001. The facts 
of the case are indicated in Lord Bingham’s judgment. The central 
question was whether SIAC, when hearing an appeal against certifi ca-
tion and detention could “receive evidence which has or may have 
been procured by torture infl icted in order to obtain evidence, by 
offi cials of a foreign state without the complicity of the British au-
thorities?”77. In the case of one of the detainees it was alleged that the 
(70) Ibid., see paragraphs 205, 223 and 224.
(71) Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and another [2009] UKHL 28 at 
paragraph 59.
(72) Justice and Security (October 2011 CM 8194 HMSO).
(73) Ibid., page 54 at paragraph 2.
(74) Ibid., page 54 at paragraph 4.
(75) At the time of writing the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill 
2011 is going through its stages in the House of Lords.
(76) A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221.
(77) Ibid. Lord Bingham, paragraph 1 at A.
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Home Secretary had relied upon evidence of a third party which had 
been extracted by torture by a foreign state. Should such evidence be 
admitted before SIAC? The appellants argued that it should not be ad-
mitted “relying on the common law of England, on the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and on principles of public international 
law”78. The respondent, the Secretary of State, agreed that this would 
be the correct answer where the torture had been infl icted by or with 
the complicity of the British authorities79. The respondent went on to 
say that it was not his intention to “rely on, or present to SIAC or to 
the Administrative Court in relation to control orders, evidence which 
he knows or believes to have been obtained by a third country by 
torture”80. Lord Bingham noted that such an intention was based on 
policy and not any acknowledged legal obligation and that such a 
policy could be altered by the Secretary of State81.
When the issues were heard before SIAC, on the central question, SIAC 
gave an affi rmative answer, such evidence could be admitted and 
such third party conduct was relevant to the weight of the evidence 
but did not render it legally inadmissible82. The Court of Appeal went 
on to affi rm that decision.
Seven Law Lords heard this appeal and they unanimously agreed that 
evidence, be it from a suspect or a witness, that had been obtained by 
torture was to be treated by the court as unfair, inherently unreliable 
and a transgression of ordinary standards of humanity and decency. 
Such evidence was also incompatible with the principles on which 
the courts should administer justice. Accordingly, such evidence could 
not lawfully be admitted against a party to a proceeding in a UK court 
regardless of who authorised or infl icted the torture83.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Ibid., paragraph 1 at B.
(80) Ibid.
(81) Ibid., paragraph 1 at C.
(82) Ibid., paragraph 8 at H.
(83) A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 2 AC 
221 at page 222.
03_payne.indd   791 20/02/12   16:47
792 ISTITUZIONI DEL FEDERALISMO     4.2011
The second aspect of this case is that whereas the courts cannot re-
ceive evidence obtained by torture what is the position of the Secre-
tary of State? Is it improper for him to use this evidence in forming an 
opinion as to whether he should issue a certifi cate against a suspect? 
Here the court took the view that the Secretary of State did not act 
unlawfully if he used such evidence to form an opinion. For instance, 
Lord Hoffman stated,
It is not the function of the courts to place limits upon the information avail-
able to the Secretary of State, particularly when he is concerned with national 
security. Provided that he acts lawfully, he may read whatever he likes. In his 
dealings with foreign governments, the type of information that he is will-
ing to receive and the questions that he asks or refrains from asking are his 
own affair. As I have said, there may be cases in which he is required to act 
urgently and cannot afford to be too nice in judging the methods by which 
the information has been obtained, although I suspect that such cases are less 
common in practice than in seminars on moral philosophy84.
Although there is a difference of function between the executive and 
the judiciary the approach taken by Lord Hoffman throws up prob-
lems of principle, the most obvious being that if torture is morally 
wrong and taints the reliability of evidence and is a practice that 
should be stamped out, why should the ‘evidence’ be used at any 
stage at all? The second problem is that when the Home Secretary is-
sues a certifi cate he is putting into effect the loss of liberty that is nor-
mally the function of a court. By acquiring this role it is arguable that 
he should be bound by judicial standards as he is weighing evidence 
with a view to depriving someone of their liberty. The third prob-
lem is the odd position of SIAC having to rule on certifi cation whilst 
excluding evidence that the Home Secretary has been permitted to 
consider. How does SIAC assess the reasonableness of the Home Sec-
retary’s suspicion where they are excluding the very evidence that he 
is using to form his opinion?
(84) Ibid. Lord Hoffman, paragraph 93.
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Be that as it may, the court also had to consider the issue of what the 
proper approach should be where there is uncertainty as to whether 
the evidence was obtained by torture or not. It was on this point that 
the court was split. The central problem here was that the detainee 
when appealing to SIAC would not have access to all the evidence 
as the secret material would be heard in a closed session albeit with 
the assistance of a special advocate. Lord Bingham dissented from 
the majority. After noting that, “The appellants contend that it is for 
a party seeking to adduce evidence to establish its admissibility if 
this is challenged. The Secretary of State submits that it is for a party 
seeking to challenge the admissibility of evidence to make good the 
factual grounds on which he bases his challenge”85 he went on to 
observe that,
I do not for my part think that a conventional approach to the burden of 
proof is appropriate in a proceeding where the appellant may not know the 
name or identity of the author of an adverse statement relied on against him, 
may not see the statement or know what the statement says, may not be able 
to discuss the adverse evidence with the special advocate appointed (without 
responsibility) to represent his interests, and may have no means of know-
ing what witness he should call to rebut assertions of which he is unaware86.
These observations make quite clear the substantial problems that ex-
ist if one bears in mind that the party in question may be innocent of 
wrong doing. Put another way, where the burden of proof is placed 
on the detainee the procedures before SIAC only work if one can as-
sume the suspect’s guilt based on the suspicion of the Home Secre-
tary, the very issue that SIAC is meant to be testing.
The test that Lord Bingham favoured was that it was for the appel-
lant or his special advocate to advance a plausible reason why the 
evidence may have been procured by torture. It would then be for 
SIAC, with its expertise, to initiate or direct such inquiry “as is neces-
(85) Ibid. Lord Bingham at paragraph 54.
(86) Ibid. Lord Bingham at paragraph 55.
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sary to enable it to form a fair judgment whether the evidence has, or 
whether there is a real risk that the evidence may have been obtained 
by torture or not”87. Lord Bingham went on to say that if SIAC was 
unable to conclude that there is not a real risk that the evidence has 
been obtained by torture it should refuse to admit it. This was not the 
test adopted by the majority. Lord Hope, apparently relying on Article 
15 of the Convention Against Torture stated that the test should be, 
“Is it established, by means of such diligent inquiries into the sources 
that it is practicable to carry out and on a balance of probabilities, 
that the information relied on by the Secretary of State was obtained 
under torture?”88. If the answer is “yes”, then the evidence should be 
excluded. The majority ruling also included the view that where there 
was doubt as to whether the evidence had been obtained by torture 
or not, the evidence should be included. Lord Roger taking this ap-
proach stated, “SIAC can look at this statement but should bear its 
doubtful origins in mind when evaluating it”89.
Lord Bingham in his judgment gives a devastating analysis of the 
shortcomings of the majority test on admissibility of evidence,
This is a test which, in the real world, can never be satisfi ed. The foreign 
torturer does not boast of his trade. The security services, as the Secretary 
of State has made clear, do not wish to imperil their relations with regimes 
where torture is practised. The special advocates have no means or resources 
to investigate. The detainee is in the dark. It is inconsistent with the most ru-
dimentary notions of fairness to blindfold a man and then impose a standard 
which only the sighted could hope to meet90.
This analysis speaks for itself with regard to the unfairness of the test 
applied by the majority.
(87) Ibid at paragraph 56.
(88) Ibid. Lord Hope at paragraph 121.
(89) Ibid. Lord Roger at paragraph 145.
(90) Ibid. Lord Bingham at paragraph 59.
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10. The Binyam Mohamed Saga
There is a series of UK cases relating to Binyam Mohamed’s attempts 
to have information disclosed that would go to show that he was sys-
tematically tortured by and at the behest of the US authorities whilst in 
captivity in the Americas, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Morocco. The ev-
idence was needed by him for his defence to capital charges brought 
by the US. Binyam Mohamed wished to establish that the confessions 
that would be used against him in the capital charges were made as 
a result of lengthy torture. In this article I shall focus on the case in 
the Court of Appeal91. The judgments indicate the substance of the 
previous litigation. By the time that the Court of Appeal heard this 
case it was evident that a member of the UK Security Service, Agent 
B, had interviewed Binyam Mohamed whilst in captivity abroad and 
that the Security Service had supplied questions for his captors and 
interrogators to pose. At the heart of this appeal case is a protracted 
attempt by the Foreign Secretary to suppress seven paragraphs of 
the judgment of the court below, the Divisional Court. The Foreign 
Secretary had issued a Public Interest Immunity Certifi cate that stated 
that publication would lead to a real risk of serious harm to the na-
tional security of the UK92. The assertion was based on the so called 
‘control principle’, a term used to describe the idea that the supplier 
of intelligence, country A, gets to determine or control who if anyone 
it is disclosed to even after that information has been disclosed to 
country B. The seven paragraphs which the Foreign Secretary wished 
to suppress were not the original documents but part of the judgment 
which contained an anodyne summary by the court gleaned from the 
documents sent by the US authorities to their counterparts in the UK 
and that related to Binyam Mohamed’s treatment whilst directly under 
US custody. The Foreign Secretary stoutly maintained that disclosure 
of the paragraphs “would damage the intelligence sharing arrange-
ments between this country and the USA, between this country and 
(91) R (Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2010] EWCA Civ 65.
(92) Ibid., Lord Judge CJ at paragraph 2.
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our allies, and the USA and its allies” and that the USA would review 
the intelligence sharing arrangements93. Notwithstanding these asser-
tions a US court had publicly recorded in the case of Farhi Saeed Bin 
Mohamed that the US Government “does not challenge or deny the 
accuracy of Binyam Mohamed’s story of brutal treatment”94. The Court 
of Appeal sets out part of the US judgement:
(a) [Mr Mohamed’s] trauma lasted for 2 long years. During that time, he was 
physically and psychologically tortured. His genitals were mutilated. He was 
deprived of sleep and food. He was summarily transported from one foreign 
prison to another. Captors held him in stress positions for days at a time. 
He was forced to listen to piercingly loud music and the screams of other 
prisoners while locked in a pitch-black cell. All the while, he was forced to 
inculpate himself and others in various plots to imperil Americans. The Gov-
ernment does not dispute this evidence (p64)
(b) In this case, even though the identity of the individual interrogator changed 
(from nameless Pakistanis, to Moroccans, to Americans, and to special agent 
(the identity is redacted)), there is no question that throughout his ordeal 
Binyam Mohamed was being held at the behest of the United States (p68) ... 
The court fi nds that [Mr Mohamed’s] will was overborne by his lengthy prior 
torture, and therefore his confessions to special agent ... do not represent reli-
able evidence to detain petitioner95.
In the light of the US court’s fi nding Sir Anthony May in his judge-
ment stated that the Foreign Secretary sought to defend a principle 
entirely devoid of factual content on which to hang it and that “it 
would be quite absurd if the US Government itself decided to reduce 
intelligence sharing because a UK court had decided to publish sum-
mary material whose essential content has been found to be true in a 
US court”96. The court dismissed the appeal of the Foreign Secretary.
(93) Ibid., Lord Judge CJ at paragraph 12.
(94) Ibid., paragraph 23.
(95) Ibid., cited at paragraph 23. The page numbers within the quotation refer to the 
original US court judgment.
(96) Ibid. Sir Anthony May at paragraph 295.
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There are many interesting features of this complex case97 which this 
brief account cannot do justice to but a couple of further aspects relat-
ing to the litigation should be addressed. Prior to the judgment being 
handed down in the Court of Appeal, counsel representing the Gov-
ernment, having received an advanced copy of the judgment, wrote 
to Lord Neuberger persuading him to remove part of paragraph 168 
of his judgment because it contained criticism of the Security Service. 
That criticism, which counsel argued was untrue and unfair, is con-
tained in the judge’s comment with regard to the Security Service’s 
claim that they knew of no instance of ill treatment of prisoners de-
tained by or on behalf of the US Government, “in this case, that does 
not seem to have been true: as the evidence showed, some Security 
Services offi cials appear to have a dubious record relating to actual 
involvement, and frankness about any such involvement, with the 
mistreatment of Mr Mohamed when he was held at the behest of US 
offi cials. I have in mind in particular witness B, but the evidence in 
this case suggests that it is likely that there were others”98. The judge 
at fi rst acquiesced in removing part of paragraph 168 when the judg-
ment was fi rst published on the 10th of February 2010. Meanwhile the 
contents of counsel’s letter to the judge appeared in the Guardian 
newspaper becoming the subject of a national discussion99. What was 
particularly interesting to observe was all the backstairs activity that is 
normally hidden from view. The full paragraph was fi nally published 
by the Court of Appeal on the 26th of February 2010. In this judgment 
the court gives a lengthy explanation of the context in which the 
paragraph was redacted and how and why the original version was 
reinstated subject to some limited amendments100.
(97) For a detailed account of the protracted litigation see A. TOMKINS, National Se-
curity and the Due Process of Law. Current Legal Problem (2011) pages 1-39, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press.
(98) R (Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2010] EWCA Civ 65, Lord Neuberger at paragraph 168.
(99) A. Tomkins cited in note 97 above, at page 20.
(100) R (Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2010] EWCA Civ 158.
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A further matter of interest is the campaign by the Government to 
portray the essence of the case as protecting the so called ‘control 
principle’. Unusually, the Director-General of the Security Service 
published an article in The Daily Telegraph on the 11th of February 
2010, the day after the redacted fi rst judgment appeared, stating that 
the reason the British Government had taken the case to the Court of 
Appeal “was not to cover up supposed British collusion in mistreat-
ment, but in order to protect the vital intelligence relationship with 
America”101.
The ramifi cations of the Binyam Mohamed case and the other cases 
such as AF (No 3) continue to play out. The current Foreign Secretary, 
William Hague, gave a speech at the Foreign Offi ce102. In the audi-
ence were the heads of the three Intelligence and Security Agencies. 
Although the bulk of the speech was taken up praising the valuable 
work of the Agencies, the nub of the speech was to commend to the 
public the Government Green Paper Justice and Security. Mr Hague 
described the Green Paper in these terms, “At its heart are proposals 
to ensure that cases involving national security information can be 
heard fairly, fully and safely in our courts, and that we protect British 
interests by preventing the disclosure of genuinely sensitive material. 
This includes intelligence information shared with Britain by intelli-
gence partners overseas”. Clearly what is driving the ‘reform’ process 
is the implications of the AF (No 3) ruling that procedural fairness 
requires the applicant to be given the gist of the case against him in 
security related cases where the evidence is heard partly in secret and 
where the special advocate has limited or no means to communicate 
with the detainee or controlee. The Green Paper outlines broad pro-
posals and invites comments from the public. Posed as a ‘Question’ 
the Green Paper states, “If feasible, the Government sees a benefi t 
in introducing legislation to clarify the contexts in which the ‘AF (No 
3)’ ‘gisting’ requirement does not apply. In what types of legal cases 
should there be a presumption that the disclosure requirement set out 
(101) Quoted in A. TOMKINS, cited in note 97 above, at page 23.
(102) W. HAGUE, Securing our Future: The Role of Secret Intelligence in Foreign Policy, 
Whitehall, London, 16th November 2011.
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in AF (No 3) does not apply?”103. The Government wishes to extend 
to all civil proceedings, where a security matter arises, a Closed Mate-
rial Procedure (CMP)104. This technique was introduced originally in 
1997 in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 and 
applied to deportation cases which had a security related element105. 
In essence the Closed Material Procedure means that the secret mate-
rial in the hearing is not revealed to the applicant but revealed to the 
court and the special advocate appointed by the Attorney-General106. 
In contrast to the Foreign Secretary’s characterisation of these propos-
als as fair, the organisation Liberty said of the proposals, “The Green 
Paper’s proposals would allow a Government to defend accusations 
of complicity in torture without revealing information which may be 
crucial to a fair hearing for the victim and to the public interest in 
media scrutiny of alleged abuses of power”107.
11. Conclusion
In the last ten years government responses to terrorist threats run the 
risk of creating a permanent security state in which liberty is gradu-
ally eroded and the norms of justice undermined. The scheme for 
indefi nite detention without trial was just such a departure from the 
norms of justice. Extending the Closed Material Procedure to all civil 
proceedings would enshrine this transformation. I agree with those 
who argue that the danger with exceptional temporary measures is 
that they soon cease to be either temporary or exceptional much to 
the detriment of the political and legal culture of a society.
Those who attack the record of the Courts as inadequate have, I 
believe, misjudged the substantial contribution they have made to 
uphold the rule of law. By contrast, successive governments have im-
(103) Justice and Security, Cm 8194 (London: HMSO October 2011) at 2.46, page 28.
(104) Ibid., 2.3, page 21.
(105) Ibid., 1.27, page 10.
(106) Ibid., 1.28, page 10.
(107) Liberty warns against “secret justice” in civil cases against the Government. Liber-
ty Press Release, London, 19th October 2011.
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plied, and their legal representatives have stated, that the courts owe 
to the executive due deference. If due deference is owed anywhere 
it is owed by the executive to the courts. Lord Hoffman summed up 
perfectly the risk of over responding to terrorist threats by way of ex-
ceptional legal measures, the real threat came, “not from terrorism but 
from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism 
may achieve. It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the terror-
ists such a victory”108.
(108) See note 50 above.
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